PATTERNS OF POWER · THE COLD WAR CASE

The Two Churches

How Two Revealed Doctrines — Revolutionary Communism and Free-Market Liberalism, Each the Creed of a Superpower, Each Descended from a Situated Insight Canonised into Scripture, Each Run by Sincere Believers in a Framework That Could Not Be Wrong — Ground the Decolonising World Between Them; How Each Promised a Final State and Counted the Corpses as the Price of Reaching It; Why the Founder of One Church Wrote the Sharpest Indictment of the Other and of Himself; and Why the Answer to Both Is Not a Third Doctrine but a Posture — 1789–2026

Thomas J. Bryan

with Claude (Anthropic)

PREFACE

This volume is the collection's capstone of the Cold War, and it sets side by side the two doctrines that divided the post-war world: revolutionary communism and free-market liberalism. Earlier studies held one half each — the volume on Marxism-Leninism tracked the first doctrine to the collapse its own unrealised promise guaranteed; the dollar studies tracked the second to the debt and austerity its institutional logic produced. This volume reads the two halves as one phenomenon. Its claim is that the two were not opposites but a matched pair: two *revealed* doctrines, each descended from a situated insight canonised into a self-validating scripture, each run by sincere believers who held the doctrine as the grammar of reality, each promising a final state in which the conflicts of history would be resolved for good, and each therefore licensed to impose its doctrine on populations that had not chosen it and to count the suffering of the imposition as the finite price of an infinite promised end.

The claim is not an equivalence, and the volume is at pains to refuse the lazy symmetry it could collapse into. The two churches were not equally murderous: the first killed faster, more directly, and on a scale its own archives now document; the second killed slower, more distantly, and through mechanisms it could more easily deny — though it drew direct blood in the periphery too. What the two shared was not a body count but a structure of belief: each read its failures not as evidence against the doctrine but as evidence of insufficiently faithful execution, and each converted an imagined final state into a present licence to break the living world to fit the model. That shared epistemic disease, and not the content of either doctrine, is the volume's subject; the decolarising world was ground between the two because the age, foreclosing plurality at the scale of the planet, offered it only churches and no tested third path.

The method is the collection's. Every load-bearing specific — the dates, the institutions, the contested figures — is verified before assertion; the body counts are given with their ranges and their disputes rather than as picked numbers; both columns of the ledger are kept in ink; the strongest counter-readings are held at full strength; and the conditions under which the verdict would fail are published at the close. The volume is anchored in the scholarship: James Scott on high modernism, Karl Polanyi on the planned market, Isaiah Berlin on the final solution, Friedrich Hayek on the fatal conceit, John Gray on the two secular utopias, the historians of the Mont Pèlerin thought collective and of the Chilean Chicago Boys, and the contested demographic literature on the famines and the terror. And it is anchored in the collection's own prior volumes, on which it builds. *Tested, not revealed.*

A NOTE ON THIS COLLABORATION

This volume, like the rest of the collection, is a collaboration between a human author and an artificial intelligence. The framework — the landscape-first method, the distinction between a tested and a revealed doctrine, the Moses dynamic by which a situated insight becomes inherited scripture, the metabolism that a high-modernist plan tears out, belief as formation rather than trick, the final state as the tell, and the synthesis of this volume, that the two great doctrines of the century are one phenomenon held in two churches — is Thomas J. Bryan's; the articulation, the historical assembly, the verification of every figure cited and word quoted, and the drafting are Claude's (Anthropic), working under the author's direction and to the project's standing rules. The author's own warning — *beware the Vanguard Party*, and beware its mirror, the council that prescribes the medicine the people must swallow whole — is the spine the volume builds out. The truth of neither doctrine is adjudicated; the analysis is of how each belief functions, never of whether it is true. The suffering on every side — the famines, the camps, the categorical eliminations, the lost decade, the anti-communist slaughter — is held with gravity, and counted, as the discipline requires, on every side at once.

THE ARGUMENT IN ELEVEN PARTS

The volume's argument, in eleven parts, runs as follows.

PART I — THE TWO CHURCHES. Why the two great doctrines are best read as a matched pair rather than as opposites; what the collection means by calling them churches; and the verdict stated at the outset — not equivalent in their corpses, but identical in their epistemic disease.

PART II — THE ANATOMY OF A REVEALED DOCTRINE. The epistemic core: the difference between a doctrine revised by evidence and one that reads failure as insufficient faith; the Moses dynamic; and Berlin's name for the belief that licenses the corpses — the faith in a final solution.

PART III — THE FIRST CHURCH: THE LINEAGE OF THE REVOLUTION. From Marx's situated insight to the science of history; Robespierre's terror as an emanation of virtue, transmitted intact through Lenin to the cadres of the periphery; the vanguard as clergy; and the classless society as the final state that licensed the price.

PART IV — THE SECOND CHURCH: THE LINEAGE OF THE MARKET. How the market doctrine, against its account of itself as the mere absence of design, was a propagated creed with a founding council on Mont Pèlerin and a formed clergy; Polanyi's demonstration that laissez-faire was planned; and the self-correcting market and the end of history as its promised final state.

PART V — TWO HIGH MODERNISMS. How both churches instance the pathology Scott named — the faith that a complex society can be redesigned from above on a simplified model; the metabolic kill of collectivisation and the Great Leap; and the collection's extension of the frame to the market church, whose price signal was a thin simplification of its own.

PART VI — THE FATAL CONCEIT, AND WHOSE IT WAS. How the sharpest indictment of one church was written by the founder of the other and convicts him too; Hayek's pretence of knowledge; the boomerang, by which his shock-therapy heirs committed the mirror conceit; and his image of the gardener, which is the posture the collection urges.

PART VII — THE COUNTRY THAT GOT BOTH: CHILE. The keystone, in which one nation received both churches in sequence: Allende's experiment and the strain and sabotage that broke it; the coup and the market church installed by an authoritarian state; Friedman's shock treatment; and the ledger of one country, the later growth against the human cost.

PART VIII — THE MILLSTONES. How the deepest tragedy fell on the decolonising world, for whom the Cold War foreclosed every option but the two scriptures; how each church's clergy carried its catechism home; and how both drew blood there — the one in categorical killing, the other in direct anti-communist slaughter and the slow attrition of debt.

PART IX — THE BELIEVERS ON BOTH SIDES. How both churches were staffed by sincere believers formed to hold the doctrine as reality rather than by cynics; how the cadre and the economist are the

same figure; how the believer’s shock when his faith fails is the proof that he believed; and the mirror of the vanguard in the technocratic council.

Part X — The Ledger, Honestly. The asymmetry held in ink against false equivalence; the contested body counts of the first church with their ranges and disputes; the slower and more deniable harms of the second; the genuine goods of each; and the finding that the two differ in scale, speed, and candour but not in disease.

Part XI — The Verdict and the Posture. The verdict on the matched pair; and the answer, which is not a third doctrine but a posture — tested not revealed, the gardener not the architect, the plural counterweights tended without end and without the comfort of a final answer.

PART I

THE TWO CHURCHES

Why the two great doctrines of the twentieth century are best read as a matched pair rather than as opposites; what the collection means by calling them churches, and why the word brackets the question of their truth rather than settling it; how each was the creed of a superpower that armed it and the decolonising world the ground they ground between; and the verdict stated at the outset, that the two are not equivalent in their corpses but identical in their epistemic disease — 1789–2026

I. One Phenomenon, Two Faiths

This volume is the collection's capstone of the Cold War, and it makes a single claim that the rest of the corpus has been assembling toward: that the two doctrines which organised the twentieth century and divided the post-war world between them — revolutionary communism and free-market liberalism — are best understood not as opposites but as a matched pair, two instances of one structure, two revealed doctrines run by sincere believers, each promising a final state, each counting the corpses on the way to it as the necessary price, and each backed by one of the two superpowers that armed it and carried it into the world. The previous studies in this inquiry have each held one half. The volume on Marxism-Leninism tracked the first doctrine to the collapse its own unrealised promise guaranteed; the volume on the dollar order and its companion on the petrodollar tracked the second to the debt and austerity its own institutional logic produced. This volume sets the two halves side by side and reads them as the thing they were: not two rival answers to the question of how to organise a human society but two versions of the same kind of answer, each wrong in the same deep way, and the peoples of Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America ground between them because the age offered no third kind of answer at all.

The claim must be stated carefully, because it is easy to mistake for a lazy equivalence and it is not one. The volume does not say the two doctrines were equally murderous, equally total, or equally candid about what they did — they were not, and a later part will hold the asymmetry in ink, because the discipline of the collection is to count honestly and refuse the comfort of a symmetry the evidence does not support. The revolutionary church killed faster, more directly, and on a scale its own archives now document; the market church killed slower, at a greater distance, and through mechanisms it could more easily deny. What the two shared was not a body count but a structure of belief: each held a doctrine that could not, from the inside, be wrong; each read its failures not as evidence against the doctrine but as evidence of insufficiently faithful execution; each promised an end-state — the classless society, the self-correcting market — in which the contradictions of history would be resolved

for good; and each, holding such a promise, found in it the licence to impose the doctrine on populations that had not chosen it and to count the suffering of the imposition as the birth-pang of the promised world. That shared structure is the subject of this volume. The corpses are counted, on every side, but the corpses are not the finding. The finding is the disease that produced them, and the disease was the same in both churches.

II. What a Church Is Here, and the Verdict Stated

The collection calls these doctrines churches deliberately, and the word does a specific analytical job rather than scoring a rhetorical point. Throughout this inquiry the project has held to one discipline where belief is concerned: it brackets the truth of a doctrine and analyses instead how the belief functions — how it is installed, who it serves, what it makes thinkable and unthinkable, and what it licenses. To call communism and market liberalism churches is not to say they are false in the way a believer would mean, nor true; it is to say that each functions, structurally, the way a revealed religion functions. Each has a scripture, canonised and authoritative. Each has a founding council and a clergy formed to read the scripture correctly. Each has a doctrine of history moving toward a promised consummation. Each has a category of heresy and a mechanism for processing those who counsel against the doctrine. And each installs its account of the world in its adherents before those adherents are in any position to weigh it — as formation, the project's second load-bearing proposition, rather than as a thesis freely examined and freely held. The economist formed in a graduate department to see the price signal as the structure of reality and the cadre formed in a party school to see the class struggle as the structure of reality are, at the level the project analyses, the same figure: a believer who experiences a contingent doctrine as the very grammar of the real, and who therefore cannot read the doctrine's failures as refutations, because to him they do not look like failures of the doctrine at all.

The verdict of the volume can therefore be stated at the outset, so the reader knows where the argument goes. It is not that one church was good and the other evil, nor that both were equally bad, but that both were *revealed* where they should have been *tested* — that each treated a situated, fallible, time-bound insight as a final and self-validating truth, and that this single epistemic error, far more than the content of either doctrine, is what made each of them lethal. A tested communism would have read the famine as evidence against forced collectivisation and revised; a revealed communism read the famine as evidence of kulak sabotage and intensified. A tested liberalism would have read the lost decade as evidence against shock liberalisation and revised; a revealed liberalism read it as evidence of insufficient reform and prescribed more. The content differed; the move was identical. And the move is the disease. This volume's whole argument is that the answer to the twentieth century is not the victory of one church over the other — the market church's apparent victory in 1991 produced its own unchecked decade of corpses, as the dollar studies showed — but the refusal of the revealed posture itself, in favour of the tested one: debug, do not defend; treat every promise of a final state as the warning light it is; and tend, without end and without the comfort of a final answer, the plural counterweights that no single doctrine owns.

PART II

THE ANATOMY OF A REVEALED DOCTRINE

The epistemic core of the whole volume, set out so a newcomer can follow it: the difference between a doctrine revised when the evidence defeats it and one that reads every failure as insufficient faith; the Moses dynamic, by which a leader's situated improvisations become inherited scripture; and the philosophical name, given by Isaiah Berlin, for the belief that licenses the corpses — the faith in a final solution in which all genuine goods are at last reconciled — 1958 and the long tradition behind it

I. Tested and Revealed

The distinction on which this volume turns is not between left and right, nor between plan and market, but between two ways of holding a belief, and it is worth setting out plainly because everything else rests on it. A *tested* doctrine is one held as a hypothesis: it makes claims about the world, those claims are exposed to evidence, and when the evidence defeats them the doctrine is revised or abandoned. A *revealed* doctrine is one held as a revelation: its truth is given in advance, prior to and independent of any evidence, so that evidence which appears to defeat it cannot count as refutation but must be re-described as something else — as sabotage, as contamination, as insufficiently faithful execution, as the corruption of the pure design by impure hands. The two are not distinguished by their content, which may be identical, but by what their holders do when the world says no. The tested holder treats the world's no as information and changes his mind. The revealed holder treats the world's no as a test of his faith and changes the world, or the people in it, or the account of why the no does not count. This is the deepest finding the collection has reached about doctrines, and it cuts across every political division, because a doctrine of the left and a doctrine of the right can each be held in either way, and it is the way of holding, not the side, that determines whether the doctrine learns or kills.

A revealed doctrine has a characteristic life-cycle, which the collection has named the Moses dynamic and which both churches in this volume display with almost diagrammatic clarity. A leader, facing a concrete situation, improvises — makes situated judgements, fitted to a particular time and place and problem, judgements that were reasonable on the evidence then available and that he himself might have revised had he lived to see them fail. Those situated improvisations are then written down, and in the writing they lose their situatedness: they cease to be one man's response to one moment and become scripture, or proven science, timeless and binding. The scripture is then inherited by believers who did not live through the situation that produced it, who encounter it already canonised, and who enforce it as eternal law — faulting, when it fails, not the doctrine but the fidelity of those who applied

it. Marx's nineteenth-century analysis of industrial capitalism, fitted to the England of the factory and the workhouse, became the science of history that Cambodian cadres applied to a peasant society a century later and a hemisphere away. Friedman's mid-century case for monetary discipline, fitted to the particular pathologies of post-war American inflation, became the universal prescription that the structural-adjustment technocrats applied to economies that bore no resemblance to the one it was drawn from. In each case the situated insight was real and the canonisation was the error: a thing true enough of one place became, as scripture, a thing imposed on every place, and the imposition counted as fidelity while the failures counted as the faithlessness of others.

II. The Final State as the Tell

What converts a revealed doctrine from a merely stubborn one into a lethal one is the particular content that revealed doctrines characteristically carry: the promise of a final state. Each of the two churches in this volume promised, at the end of history, a condition in which the deep conflicts of human life would be not managed but resolved — the classless society in which exploitation ends and the state withers away, the self-correcting global market in which prosperity becomes general and the great questions of political economy are settled for good. The philosopher Isaiah Berlin gave this promise its sharpest analysis, and the volume leans on him because he named the precise mechanism by which it kills. One belief, Berlin argued in 1958, is responsible above all others for the slaughter of human beings on the altars of the great historical ideals: the belief that somewhere — in the past or the future, in revelation or in science — there is *a final solution*, a single arrangement in which all genuine human goods are at last made compatible and realised together. Berlin called the underlying assumption *monism*: the faith that all true values must in the end cohere into one harmonious whole, so that there is one right answer to the question of how to live, and the only task is to find and impose it. Against monism Berlin set value-pluralism: the tragic recognition that the genuine goods of human life — liberty and equality, justice and mercy, the claims of the present and the claims of the future — are many, are not all compatible, and cannot all be maximised together, so that politics is the permanent negotiation of irreducible conflict and not the implementation of a discovered solution.

The reason the final-state promise is lethal, and the reason the collection treats any claim of a final state as the tell of a revealed doctrine about to count corpses, is a matter of simple and terrible arithmetic, which Berlin saw and stated. If the final state is real — if there truly is an end-condition of perfect and permanent human flourishing, the classless society or the harmonious market — then any present suffering is finite and the future good is infinite, and no price in present corpses can be too high to pay for it. The man who believes he is building the permanent end of exploitation can justify any famine as its birth-pang; the man who believes he is installing the self-correcting market that will enrich the world can justify any lost decade as its transition cost; because in each case the suffering is weighed against an infinite good and found, by the arithmetic of infinity, to be worth it. This is why the promise of a final state is not an innocent piece of optimism but the specific belief that licenses the corpses, and why the tested posture must treat it as a warning light wherever it appears — in the withering state, in the end of history, in the self-correcting market, in any doctrine that locates, just over the horizon, a condition in which the conflicts will be over and the only remaining task is to pay the price of arrival. The volume's two churches are both, at their core, machines for converting an infinite imagined future into a licence for a finite real slaughter. The conversion is the same in both. Only the scripture that powers it differs.

PART III

THE FIRST CHURCH — THE LINEAGE OF THE REVOLUTION

How the revolutionary doctrine ran from a situated insight to an inherited scripture and a formed clergy: Robespierre's terror as an emanation of virtue, transmitted intact through Lenin to Stalin and Mao and the cadres of the decolonising world; Marx's nineteenth-century diagnosis canonised as the science of history; the vanguard party as the church's clergy; and the classless society as the final state that licensed the price — 1789–1979

I. From the Insight to the Scripture

The first church's scripture was drawn from a real and powerful insight, which is the necessary starting point, because the collection's discipline is to grant that each doctrine was rational on the evidence available to its authors before tracing how it became lethal in the hands of its heirs. Marx's nineteenth-century analysis of industrial capitalism saw something true: that the new factory order concentrated wealth and immiserated the workers who produced it, that the liberal claim of free and equal exchange concealed a structural extraction, that the apparently natural market was a historical and changeable arrangement rather than an eternal one — the same insight, it is worth noting, that the second church's own heretic, Karl Polanyi, would later turn against the market church itself. Had this insight been held as tested — as a powerful nineteenth-century diagnosis, fitted to its time, to be revised as conditions changed — it might have informed a century of reform, as in part it did, in the trade unions and welfare states and labour laws that the market church's later triumphalism would forget it owed to the pressure of the left. What made it lethal was its canonisation: its conversion, by Engels's framing and the movement's need, from a fallible analysis into *scientific socialism*, a science of history with laws as certain as physics, a doctrine that did not describe one possible future but predicted the inevitable one, and that therefore could not be wrong but only insufficiently served.

Once the analysis had become a science of the inevitable, the characteristic move of the revealed doctrine was available, and the first church made it at its founding moment, before Marx was even its prophet. The collection has traced, in its study of the Paris apparatus, the doctrine that Robespierre articulated in 1794 and that the whole subsequent revolutionary tradition inherited: that revolutionary terror was not a regrettable necessity but *an emanation of virtue* — the form that revolutionary virtue necessarily took when it had to act against the corruption and treason the revolutionary situation threw up — so that the regime conducting the terror needed no apology, requiring only that it be substantively virtuous and its victims substantively the enemies of virtue, and that opposition to the terror was itself the proof of insufficient virtue, the counsel of moderation revealing the counsellor as

an enemy. This is the revealed structure in its purest political form: the doctrine cannot fail, only be betrayed; the one who doubts is not raising a question but confessing a corruption; and the apparatus is licensed to process the doubters accordingly. Lenin inherited this doctrine consciously and named the Jacobins his predecessors; Stalin's collectivisation and purges were defended in its terms; the cadres who absorbed it in the cultural environment of the mid-century European parties carried it, intact, to the killing fields of the societies they would later govern. The scripture had become a machine for re-describing every failure as a betrayal and every doubter as a traitor, and the machine ran wherever the doctrine was installed.

II. The Vanguard and the Promised End

The first church's clergy was the vanguard party, and its theory was set out by Lenin in 1902 in the pamphlet whose title the collection has borrowed for its own coda: that the working class, left to itself, would attain only a trade-union consciousness, and that revolutionary consciousness had therefore to be brought to it from outside, by a disciplined cadre of professional revolutionaries who understood the science of history the workers could not yet grasp. The structure this licensed is the one the project's author has warned of in his own voice, and it is worth giving plainly because it is the church's load-bearing danger: the vanguard is the body of those who claim to understand the doctrine that ordinary people cannot, and who therefore claim the authority to direct the people — including, when the doctrine requires it, to direct the killing — on the strength of an understanding the people are told they lack. *Beware the Vanguard Party*, the author wrote: beware the one who says that he alone sees the elite power behind everything, that you are not equipped to see what he sees, and that you must therefore kill whomever he names, because he knows who the enemies are and the doubt you feel is exactly what the enemies want. The vanguard's claim to privileged knowledge of the science of history is what converts the doctrine into a command structure, because if the science is certain and the cadre alone can read it, then the cadre's directives carry the authority of the inevitable, and resistance to them is resistance to history itself.

The promise that powered the whole apparatus was the final state, and the collection has tracked, in its study of the Soviet collapse, what that promise was and what its non-arrival meant. The doctrine promised the classless society, the end of exploitation, the withering away of the state — a consummation after which the coercive apparatus would no longer be needed because the conditions that required it would have been transcended. The promise was never approached; what seventy years produced was not a society fallen short of the classless ideal but one in which the ideal had been inverted, a hereditary ruling class of the party and the security organs sitting atop a population it exploited through mechanisms that differed in vocabulary but not in function from the ones Marx had described. And here the revealed structure showed its final cost: because the doctrine could not be wrong, the permanent gap between the promised withering and the actual swelling of the state could not be read as refutation, only as the not-yet of a consummation still to come, or the sabotage of enemies still to be found — so that the emergency that was supposed to be temporary became permanent, the dictatorship that was supposed to wither became the form of the state, and the terror that was supposed to be the birth-pang of freedom became the ordinary condition of a society waiting for a future that the doctrine guaranteed and reality withheld. The first church's corpses were counted, in the famines and the camps and the categorical eliminations a later part will weigh; but the corpses followed from the structure — a revealed science, a clerical vanguard, a final state — and not from the

cruelty of particular men, most of whom believed, to the end, that they were the servants of an inevitable liberation.

PART IV

THE SECOND CHURCH — THE LINEAGE OF THE MARKET

How the market doctrine, against its own account of itself as the mere absence of design, was in fact a designed and propagated creed with a founding council and a formed clergy; the meeting on Mont Pèlerin in 1947 and the thought collective it launched; Polanyi's demonstration that the free market was planned and had become almost a religious creed; and the self-correcting market and the end of history as the second church's promised final state — 1938–1991

I. The Council on the Mountain

The second church's first line of defence is the claim that it is not a church at all — that where communism was a doctrine imposed by design, the market is simply what happens when design is withheld, the spontaneous order that emerges when no one plans, the absence of a creed rather than the presence of one. The collection rejects this self-description, and the rejection is the heart of the part, because the market doctrine was as deliberately designed, as consciously propagated, and as institutionally organised as its rival. Its founding council met in April 1947 at a hotel on Mont Pèlerin above Lake Geneva, where the economist Friedrich Hayek gathered thirty-nine like-minded thinkers — among them Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Karl Popper, and Ludwig von Mises — to found the Mont Pèlerin Society and to organise the defence and propagation of market liberalism against the planning, the collectivism, and the social democracy that dominated the post-war world. The historians of the movement, Mirowski and Plehwe foremost, have given it the name it earned: a *thought collective*, a deliberately built transnational network of scholars, foundations, and institutes whose purpose was to develop a doctrine and carry it, over a generation, from the academic margins to the commanding heights of policy — to Thatcher and Reagan, to the Washington Consensus, and, through the Chicago department that was the council's American stronghold, to the Chile of the Chicago Boys. This is a clergy and a propagation, not a spontaneous order discovering itself. The market church had its Nicene council on a Swiss mountain, and it built, with patient and well-funded deliberation, the institutional church that would carry its creed into the world.

The naming matters because it dissolves the asymmetry the second church most relies on — the claim that it merely refrained where its rival imposed. Both churches imposed; both planned; both built clergies and propagated scripture; and the market church's pretence that it did none of these things, that it was only removing the distortions and letting the natural order assert itself, is precisely the move by which a designed arrangement disguises itself as an inevitability and so escapes the scrutiny a confessed design would attract. When the Chicago Boys remade the Chilean economy, they did not

refrain from planning; they planned, in a five-hundred-page document drafted in advance, and imposed the plan through an authoritarian state on a population that had not chosen it. When the structural-adjustment technocrats rewrote the economies of the indebted South, they did not let the natural order emerge; they prescribed, in detailed and uniform programmes, the privatisations and deregulations and budget cuts the doctrine required, and enforced them as the condition of the credit a defaulting state could not refuse. The market church's deepest legitimating belief — that it represents not a choice among contestable arrangements but the absence of imposition, the simple removal of the dead hand of the state so that nature can resume — is the managed belief the project's framework would predict: the story a designed order tells to make its design invisible, and so to place its costs beyond the reach of the political argument that any confessed choice would have to win.

II. The Creed That Called Itself Nature

The demonstration that the market order was made rather than found was given, devastatingly and in advance, by a heretic of the second church's own broad tradition. Writing in 1944, the same year the dollar order was assembled at Bretton Woods, the economic historian Karl Polanyi laid down the line that the whole of this part turns on: *laissez-faire was planned*. The self-regulating market, Polanyi showed, did not arise spontaneously when the state stepped back; it had to be created, deliberately and often violently, by an enormous and sustained programme of state action — the enclosures, the abolition of the old protections, the manufacture of markets in land and labour and money that had never been commodities before — so that the apparently natural order of the free market was in fact, as Polanyi put it with a precision the second church has never answered, planned, while the social protections that later arose to defend society against it were not. Polanyi saw, too, what the market doctrine had become in its zealots' hands: laissez-faire, he wrote, had been catalysed into a drive of uncompromising ferocity, an economic movement turned almost into a religious creed — the church's own historian, conceding the church. The market was not the absence of a doctrine. It was a doctrine that had succeeded in calling itself nature, and the calling was its central and most effective article of faith.

The second church's final state, the promise that did for it what the classless society did for its rival, was the self-correcting market itself, and after 1991 the promise acquired a name and a prophet. With the collapse of the first church, the second declared not merely a victory but a consummation: the end of history, the final form of human social organisation reached at last, liberal-democratic capitalism as the terminus toward which all societies were now bound to converge, the great questions settled and only the administration of the settled answer remaining. This was the same structure as the rival it had buried — a final state just over the horizon, in which the deep conflicts would be resolved and the doctrine vindicated for good — and it licensed the same arithmetic. If the self-correcting market is the end-state of human prosperity, then the suffering of the transition to it is finite and the prosperity infinite, and the lost decade, the austerity, the shock that breaks a society to remake it on the model are all, by the arithmetic of the promised consummation, worth their price. The market church read its failures exactly as the first church read its own: not as evidence against the doctrine but as evidence of insufficiently faithful execution, the reform too timid, the liberalisation too partial, the state not yet shrunk enough — more medicine, never a different diagnosis. The collection has documented, in the figure of Alan Greenspan confessing under oath the *flaw* in the model he had held for forty years, the moment a high priest of the second church met a refutation his doctrine could not absorb. That a man

so placed could be so genuinely shocked is the proof that he had been a believer and not a cynic — and that the second church, like the first, ran on a faith its servants held as the structure of reality, and could not see past until reality broke it.

PART V

TWO HIGH MODERNISMS — THE PLAN AND THE PRICE SIGNAL

How both churches were instances of a single pathology the anthropologist James Scott named — the high-modernist faith that a complex society can be redesigned from above on a simplified model — and how each imposed its thin simplification on a living complexity that did not fit it; the metabolic kill of forced collectivisation and the Great Leap; and the collection's extension of Scott's frame to the market church, whose price signal was a thin simplification of its own — 1928–1991

I. Scott's Four Conditions and the Metabolic Kill

The deepest structural account of why both churches killed was given by an anthropologist who was studying neither of them as such. James Scott's analysis of the great planning disasters of the twentieth century identified four conditions whose combination produces catastrophe: a state that has made its society *legible* by stripping away local complexity into administrable categories; a *high-modernist ideology*, a muscle-bound confidence in the power of science to redesign every aspect of social life from above; an *authoritarian state* willing to use coercion to impose the redesign; and a *prostrate civil society* unable to resist it. Where the four combine, Scott showed, the planners impose a schematic vision that does violence to the complex interdependencies it cannot see, because the model is always a radical simplification of the living reality, and the reality, when forced to conform to the model, does not conform but breaks. Scott drew his cases mostly from the statist and revolutionary left — Soviet collectivisation, the villagisation of Tanzania, the building of Brasília — and the first church is the textbook instance of his pattern: the doctrine that read a peasant society through the simplified categories of class and mode of production, the authoritarian state that imposed the reading by force, the civil society too broken to resist, and the violence done to the actual interdependencies of actual rural life when the model was driven through them.

The cost of that violence is the metabolic kill the collection's first inquiry described, and the first church's two great famines are its clearest and most terrible cases. Forced collectivisation in the Soviet Union, the model of the rationalised collective farm imposed on a countryside that did not fit it, produced the famine of 1932–33, in which the most careful demographic studies estimate that something near 3.9 million people died in Ukraine alone, within a range that scholars place between roughly 3.5 and 7 million — the metabolism of provisioning torn out by the imposition of the model, and the difference collected, as the framework predicts, as mass death. Mao's Great Leap Forward, the model of the people's commune and the backyard furnace and the falsified grain report imposed on the

whole of rural China, produced between 1958 and 1962 the deadliest famine in recorded history, in which the mainstream scholarly consensus places the dead at between thirty and forty-five million — Yang Jisheng's archival reckoning at thirty-six million, Frank Dikötter's at forty-five — while grain was exported from the starving countryside to maintain the appearance the model required. These are not the by-products of cruelty; they are the direct output of high modernism, the violence the thin simplification does to the complex interdependency when an authoritarian state drives the model through a prostrate society. And the revealed structure ensured that the dying did not stop the model: the famine could not be read as refutation, only as sabotage or as the not-yet of a harvest the doctrine still promised, so that the model ran on, and counted the corpses, and called them the price.

II. The Mirror — The Market as Thin Simplification

The collection's extension of Scott's frame, and the part's most contestable and most important move, is to recognise the second church as a high modernism of its own — the mirror image of the first, built on a different thin simplification but identical in structure. Scott himself drew his cases from the planning left, and the volume grants the point: his book is a critique of the state that sees like a state, and it has even been embraced by free-market readers who took it as a vindication of the market against the plan. But the market doctrine, in its revealed and imposed form, satisfies every one of Scott's four conditions, and the simplification it imposes is as thin and as violent as the commune. Its thin simplification is the model itself — the price signal, the efficient market, the rational actor — a radical abstraction from the dense particularity of an actual society's institutions, expectations, and provisioning, treated as the whole truth of how an economy works and the template to which an actual economy must be forced to conform. Its high-modernist confidence is the conviction that this model is universal science, applicable without regard to local conditions, so that the same prescription — privatise, deregulate, liberalise, cut — can be written for societies that share nothing but their place on the wrong side of the doctrine. Its authoritarian state and prostrate civil society are, in the cases that matter most, supplied directly: Pinochet's Chile, where the model was imposed by a dictatorship on a society broken by coup and terror, is high modernism in market form as cleanly as collectivisation is high modernism in plan form.

The reason the second church's high modernism is harder to see is precisely its central article of faith — that it is removing a design rather than imposing one, letting nature resume rather than forcing a model through. But the price signal is not nature; it is a model of nature, a thin simplification, and when an authoritarian state drives it through a living economy at speed, it does the same violence to the same complex interdependencies that the commune did, and produces, in its own register, the same kind of casualty. The shock that liberalises an economy in a year does not let the natural order emerge; it tears out the existing arrangements of provisioning and protection — the subsidies, the public employment, the price controls, the institutions that, however inefficient on the model, were the actual metabolism by which an actual population was fed and housed and kept — and the population, when the model is driven through, does not adjust on the model's timetable but is impoverished on history's. The lost decade of the indebted South, which the dollar studies counted, is the market church's famine: slower than the Great Leap, more distributed, more deniable, mediated by the impersonal logic of the rate and the conditionality rather than by the visible hand of the commissar — but the same structural event, a thin simplification imposed by an authoritarian arrangement on a prostrate society, doing

violence to interdependencies it could not see, and read by the doctrine not as refutation but as the price of a transition still insufficiently complete.

PART VI

THE FATAL CONCEIT, AND WHOSE IT WAS

How the sharpest indictment of one church was written by the founder of the other, and convicts him too; Hayek's demonstration that the planner's pretence of knowledge makes him a tyrant and a destroyer of an order no brain designed; the boomerang, by which his own shock-therapy heirs committed the mirror conceit they were warned against; and how Hayek's own image of the gardener, not the craftsman, is precisely the posture the collection urges against both churches — 1974 and after

I. Hayek's Indictment of the Planners

The most devastating critique of the first church was written by the founder of the second, and the volume dwells on it because the critique is correct, and because its correctness is exactly what makes the rest of the part possible. In his Nobel lecture of December 1974, *The Pretence of Knowledge*, Friedrich Hayek set out the argument that is the strongest thing either church ever produced against the other. The planner, Hayek argued, suffers from a fatal illusion about the nature of his own knowledge: he imagines that he can possess and act upon the information needed to design and direct a complex society, when in truth the knowledge that makes a society work is dispersed across millions of individuals, local and tacit and fragmentary, and can never be gathered into the single mind or the single bureau that the plan requires. The planner's confidence that he can redesign the social order from above is therefore not merely a mistake but a *pretence* — a claim to a knowledge no one can have — and the pretence is dangerous, because acting on it requires forcing the dispersed and living reality to conform to the planner's necessarily impoverished model. The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge, Hayek wrote, should teach the student of society a lesson of humility that would guard him against becoming an accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society — a striving that makes the planner not only a tyrant over his fellows but the destroyer of a civilisation that no brain has designed and that has grown from the free efforts of millions. As an indictment of the first church — of collectivisation, of the Great Leap, of every commune driven through a countryside on a model — it is exact and complete. Hayek named the disease, and named it correctly.

The diagnosis was right, and the collection credits it fully, because the project's own account of the metabolic trap is in large part Hayek's knowledge problem stated in the language of provisioning: the coordinating apparatus of a complex society embodies more practical knowledge than any planner can hold, and tearing it out to install a model collects the difference as catastrophe. Where Hayek was right, the volume says he was right, and his being right about the first church is not in question. What is in question — and what the next section turns to — is whether the critique stops where Hayek wished it

to stop, at the door of the plan, or whether it walks on, as the logic of it must, to the door of the market church Hayek himself founded. For the fatal conceit Hayek diagnosed is not the property of the left. It is the property of anyone who believes he holds the knowledge to redesign a complex society from above on a simplified model and the authority to impose the redesign — and that description, the volume has already shown, fits the market church in its revealed and imposed form as precisely as it fits the commune. Hayek built the indictment. The question is whether he noticed it was a mirror.

II. The Boomerang

He did not, and the failure to notice is the part's central irony and one of the collection's sharpest illustrations of how a revealed doctrine blinds even its most brilliant servants to its own reflection. The heirs of Hayek's church — the Chicago economists, the shock therapists, the structural-adjustment technocrats — committed, in the name of the market, precisely the fatal conceit Hayek had diagnosed in the name of the plan. They believed they held the knowledge to redesign whole economies from above, on the simplified model of the efficient market, and the authority to impose the redesign at speed, by shock, through whatever authoritarian instrument was to hand; and they drove their model through the living interdependencies of actual societies with exactly the confidence, and exactly the disregard for dispersed and local knowledge, that Hayek had identified as the planner's tyranny. The shock therapist who believed he could remake the Chilean or the Russian or the Bolivian economy in a year, by the wholesale and immediate imposition of the market model, was the planner of Hayek's lecture in a market mirror — possessed of the same pretence of knowledge, guilty of the same fatal striving to control a society from above, and productive, in his own register, of the same destruction of an order no brain had designed. The knowledge problem does not respect the planner's politics. A market imposed by a confident few on a society that did not choose it, at a speed the model dictates and the society cannot bear, is a plan; and the man who imposes it, however fervently he believes he is liberating the spontaneous order rather than designing one, is committing the conceit Hayek named, against the warning Hayek wrote, blind to it because his own church had taught him to see imposition only on the other side.

And here the part closes on the image that is, not coincidentally, the collection's own posture, because Hayek supplied it in the same lecture that the market church forgot. The student of society, Hayek wrote, should use his necessarily limited knowledge not as the craftsman shapes his handiwork — imposing a designed form on passive material — but as the gardener tends his plants, cultivating a growth he does not command by providing the conditions in which it can flourish on its own terms. This is the tested posture exactly, the gardening-not-architecture the collection's coda urges against every revealed doctrine: the humility that treats a complex society as a living thing to be tended and adjusted rather than a blank material to be redesigned, that works with the grain of dispersed and local knowledge rather than against it, that releases pressure through reform rather than storing it for rupture, and that refuses the architect's fantasy of the finished and final design. Hayek wrote the posture and named the disease, and then his own church caught the disease he had named, because a revealed doctrine cannot apply its own best insight to itself — the gardener's humility was for the other church, and the architect's conceit was invisible at home. The deepest lesson of the part is therefore not that Hayek was wrong but that being right is not enough: the sharpest critique of each church lay available in the writings of the other, and neither church could hear it about itself, because the thing that makes a

doctrine revealed is precisely the inability to read its own failures, or its own best critics, as anything but the error of the unfaithful.

PART VII

THE COUNTRY THAT GOT BOTH — CHILE

The keystone case, in which a single nation received both churches in sequence and paid for each: Allende's democratic-socialist experiment and the strain and destabilisation that broke it; the coup of 1973 and the market church installed by an authoritarian state on a prostrate society; Friedman's prescription of shock treatment and the believers who administered it; and the ledger of one country, the later growth held against the human cost and the revolt that came due — 1970–2019

I. The First Church's Hour

No single country illustrates the thesis as cleanly as Chile, because Chile, almost uniquely, received both churches in succession and within a single generation, so that the same people lived through the imposition of the first doctrine and then the imposition of the second, and paid in both phases. The first church's hour came with the election in 1970 of Salvador Allende, a Marxist committed to a democratic road to socialism, who set about the programme the doctrine prescribed: the nationalisation of the copper mines and the banks and much of industry, the acceleration of land reform, the redistribution of income toward the workers and the poor. The volume holds this phase fairly, as the discipline requires, and the fairness cuts in two directions. The programme expressed a real and democratically mandated response to a genuinely unequal society, and it is not to be dismissed as mere folly; but it also ran, within two years, into the strain the first inquiry would predict when a complex provisioning system is rapidly remade on a model — accelerating inflation, the flight of capital and expertise, shortages and a black market, the metabolism of supply faltering as the arrangements that had coordinated it were torn up faster than new ones could be built. And the strain was not Allende's alone to own, because the second church's own superpower was actively working to deepen it: the United States, determined to prevent a successful Marxist government in its hemisphere, applied economic pressure designed, in the phrase of the period, to make the economy scream, cutting credit and funding the opposition and the destabilisation. The first church's hour in Chile was thus a genuine experiment broken by a combination of its own metabolic strain and a superpower's deliberate sabotage — the doctrine's internal difficulty and the rival church's external hostility compounding toward the crisis that the soldiers would resolve.

II. The Second Church's Hour

The resolution was the coup of the eleventh of September 1973, in which the armed forces under General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the government and Allende died in the presidential palace, and with it came the second church's hour, prepared in advance and waiting. A group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago — the *Chicago Boys*, products of a deliberate project begun in the mid-1950s under which the Chicago department, funded by American foundations and the State Department, had educated a cohort of Chileans in the market doctrine and installed them, on their return, with an academic hegemony at the Catholic University of Santiago — had drafted, in the months before the coup, a five-hundred-page economic programme known as *El Ladrillo*, the Brick. With the elected government destroyed and civil society prostrate under the terror of the new regime, the dictatorship handed the Chicago Boys broad power to drive the Brick through, and the second church's high modernism was imposed exactly as the first church's had been elsewhere — a model drafted by a formed clergy, imposed by an authoritarian state, on a society broken and unable to resist. When inflation persisted, the regime turned to the doctrine's prophet himself: in March 1975 Milton Friedman travelled to Chile, met Pinochet for an hour, and prescribed the cure the doctrine demanded, telling the general that a serious illness required serious measures and that *shock treatment is the only way*. The shock was administered — drastic and immediate cuts in spending and the money supply — and its first effect was the one the model accepts as the price of the cure: industrial production fell by some twenty-eight per cent and output by near thirteen in 1975, the recession deliberately induced to break the inflation, the pain imposed on a population that had not chosen the doctrine any more than it had chosen the one before it. Friedman defended his role in the terms of the believer, comparing the economist who advises a brutal regime to a physician who gives technical advice to help end a plague — the doctrine sincerely held as a cure, the political character of the patient bracketed as irrelevant to the science.

III. The Ledger of One Country

The ledger of Chile must be kept in both columns and at full strength, because the case is the volume's keystone precisely insofar as it resists a simple reading, and the counter-position is genuine. The market church's defenders point, with justice, to what followed the shock: that Chile, after the deep recession and a second and catastrophic crash in 1982, became over the following decades the most prosperous and dynamic economy in Latin America, that absolute poverty fell substantially over the long run, that the reforms the Chicago Boys imposed are credited by serious economists with a real and lasting transformation, and that the careful scholarship — Sebastián Edwards foremost — has shown that the cartoon of a pure shock doctrine cynically imposed is false, the Chicago Boys being formed believers with their own genuine convictions rather than the agents of a conspiracy. The volume credits all of this, because the discipline requires it and because the goods were real. But the other column is equally real and must be entered beside it. The transformation was imposed by a dictatorship that detained, tortured, killed, and disappeared its opponents, the market reforms and the terror running in the same years and the same hands; the model produced not only growth but a deep and durable inequality, and the 1982 crash that the doctrine had not foreseen wiped out much of the early gain; and the promises the model made to the Chilean people — that the privatised pensions and the marketised

services would deliver security and dignity — came due, a generation later, in the social explosion of 2019, when a society that had been told it was the doctrine's success story rose against the precarity the doctrine had normalised. Chile is the volume's keystone because it is neither the market church's triumph nor its crime alone but both at once: a real and lasting economic transformation, achieved by a formed clergy through an authoritarian state on a prostrate society, at a human cost the doctrine counted as the price of a cure, with the bill for the cure still being presented decades later. One country, two churches, the same people paying for each, and in neither phase consulted about whether the doctrine being imposed upon them was one they would have chosen.

PART VIII

THE MILLSTONES — THE DECOLONISING WORLD BETWEEN

How the deepest tragedy of the age fell on the smaller nations of Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, for whom the Cold War foreclosed every option but the two scriptures; how each church's formed clergy carried its catechism home to the periphery; and how both churches drew blood there — the one in the direct and categorical killing of its enemies, the other in the direct anti-communist slaughter and the slow attrition of debt — 1948–2000

I. The Foreclosed Third Door

The cruelty of the age, for the peoples who were neither superpower, was that it offered them no third door. A newly independent nation in 1960 — a Mali, an Indonesia, a Ghana, a Chile, a Congo — faced a genuine and urgent problem of how to build a state and feed a population and find a place in the world economy, and the age presented exactly two answers to that problem, each a complete and revealed doctrine, each backed by a superpower that would fund the nation that chose it and work to break the nation that chose the other. There was the revolutionary catechism, which promised liberation through the vanguard and the plan and offered Soviet or Chinese patronage to those who adopted it; and there was the market catechism, which promised development through liberalisation and integration and offered American patronage, credit, and protection to those who adopted it. What there was not was a third kind of answer — a tested, plural, revisable, locally-fitted approach that treated the nation's problem as a problem to be worked at rather than a doctrine to be applied — because the structure of the Cold War made every such approach suspect to both superpowers and safe with neither. The foreclosure was the tragedy. The collection's whole framework holds that liberty and reform widen where plurality is preserved and rupture follows where it is foreclosed; and the Cold War foreclosed plurality at the level of the whole planet, allowing the decolonising nations not a field of options but a choice between two churches, each of which would, if chosen, install its revealed doctrine and count the local corpses as the price of the promised end. The small nations had agency — they chose, they manoeuvred, some played the superpowers against each other — but they did not have a third framework, and the absence of one is what ground them.

II. The Catechisms Carried Home

Both churches propagated to the periphery through their formed clergy, and the collection has already traced, in its study of the error carried home, how a doctrine absorbed in the metropole is exported

intact to a society it was never fitted to. The first church carried its catechism home through the cadres formed in the parties and the schools of the revolutionary movement, who returned to their own societies with the scripture they had absorbed and imposed it, faithfully, on a reality that did not match it. The Cambodian students who absorbed the categorical doctrine of revolutionary virtue in the cultural environment of the mid-century French party returned to install it as the Khmer Rouge, and the categorical elimination that followed — the evacuated cities, the liquidated educated classes, the cadres purged in waves — was the metropolitan scripture applied to a peasant society by believers who faulted only the fidelity of its execution. The Ethiopian officers who absorbed the Marxist-Leninist model installed it as the Derg, with its own red terror and its own politically-amplified famine. The second church carried its catechism home through a clergy formed identically, if more comfortably: the Chicago Boys and their counterparts across the South, the economists trained in the market doctrine in American and European departments and returned to their own treasuries and central banks to impose the model the doctrine prescribed, and the structural-adjustment technocrats who arrived with the same uniform programme for societies that shared nothing but their debt. The two propagations are the same structural event — a revealed doctrine, formed into a clergy in the metropole, carried home and imposed on a periphery it did not fit, with every local failure read as the unfaithfulness of the local rather than the wrongness of the doctrine.

III. The Blood, Fast and Slow

And both churches drew blood in the periphery, which is the part the honest ledger most requires, because it is tempting and false to assign the fast and direct killing to one church and only the slow attrition to the other. The first church's blood in the decolonising world was fast and categorical: the Cambodian killing fields, where something between a fifth and a quarter of the population died under a regime applying the revolutionary catechism; the Ethiopian terror and famine; the categorical eliminations that followed wherever the doctrine of revolutionary virtue was installed and read its enemies as contamination to be cleared. But the second church's blood was not only the slow attrition of debt, though that attrition was real and vast — the lost decade the dollar studies counted, the austerity that cut the provisioning of the poor who had not borrowed, the development reversed across a continent by a rate decision made elsewhere. The second church also killed fast and directly in the periphery, in the name of its faith, and the clearest case is Indonesia, where in 1965 and 1966 the army and its allied militias, in an anti-communist purge that the United States supported and to which American officials supplied lists of names, killed somewhere between five hundred thousand and a million people — party members, suspected sympathisers, trade unionists, teachers, ethnic Chinese — one of the great slaughters of the century, carried out in the name of the anti-communist faith and largely forgotten in the West it served. To these must be added the anti-communist interventions and the dirty wars and the coordinated repression of the hemisphere's security states, the direct violence of the second church's containment of the first. The honest finding is that both churches killed in the periphery, fast and slow, directly and at a distance; that the first church's direct killing was larger and more categorical; and that the second church's harm combined a direct anti-communist blood-letting with a slow financial attrition that its distance and its impersonality made easier to deny but did not make less lethal to the child who left school in São Paulo or starved in a village whose clinic the austerity had closed.

PART IX

THE BELIEVERS ON BOTH SIDES

How both churches were staffed, at every level, by sincere believers formed to hold the doctrine as the structure of reality rather than by cynics executing a known fraud; how the cadre and the economist are the same structural figure; how the shock of the believer when his faith fails is the proof that he believed; and why the danger of the vanguard has a mirror in the technocratic council that prescribes the medicine the people must swallow whole — 1936–2008

I. The Cadre and the Economist

The most important thing the two churches share, and the thing that most sharply separates this account from the conspiratorial reading either invites, is that both were staffed, from the periphery to the apex, by sincere believers and not by cynics. The cadre formed in the party school to read the class struggle as the engine of history, and the economist formed in the graduate department to read the price signal as the structure of the economy, are the same figure at the level the project analyses: each absorbed his doctrine through the long apparatus of his formation, in the same departments and journals and institutions that formed his peers, before he was in any position to weigh it; each came to hold the doctrine not as a thesis he had examined and chosen but as the very grammar of reality, the obvious truth that only the unformed or the corrupt could fail to see; and each therefore enforced the doctrine not as a fraud he was perpetrating but as a cure he was administering, sincerely convinced that the bitter medicine was curative and the pain the necessary price of health. This is the project's second proposition — belief is formation, not trick — applied to both churches at once, and it is what makes them so durable and so hard to indict. There was no need for a cynical centre directing either church, because the formation did the work the centre would have had to do: it produced believers who directed themselves, who enforced the doctrine as conviction, who read its failures as the unfaithfulness of others, and who needed no instruction to defend the order they served because they experienced its defence as the defence of the truth.

II. Shocked Disbelief

The proof that the believers were believers and not cynics is what happens to them when the doctrine fails, and the collection has documented it on both sides. When the first church's promise of the withering state was finally and undeniably falsified, the true believers did not experience the cynic's quiet recalculation but the believer's vertigo — the disorientation of a man whose grammar of reality has been refuted, which is why the Soviet collapse produced not a managed transition but a population

and a cadre alike unmoored, the faith that had organised their world dissolving faster than anything could replace it. And when the second church's promise was falsified in the financial crisis of 2008, its highest priest displayed the identical symptom under oath: Alan Greenspan, who had run the apparatus of global money for eighteen years on the conviction that the self-regulating market was the best of all possible orders, told a congressional committee that he had found a *flaw* in the model he had held for forty years, and that he was in a state of shocked disbelief — precisely the shock a cynic never feels, because the cynic never believed, and precisely the shock that proves the believer believed, because only a man for whom the doctrine was the structure of reality is destroyed when reality refutes it. The shared lesson is the danger the project's author named in his own voice and that this volume generalises to both churches. *Beware the Vanguard Party*, he wrote — beware the body of those who claim the privileged knowledge that licenses them to direct the people and, when the doctrine requires, the killing. The warning has a mirror the volume insists upon: beware, equally, the technocratic council that claims the privileged knowledge of the model and prescribes the medicine the people must swallow whole, that tells a society the shock is the only way and the pain the price of the cure, and that reads the society's suffering not as a refutation of the prescription but as the proof that the dose was not yet large enough. The vanguard and the council are the same structure wearing different vestments: each a clergy claiming to read a science the people cannot, each licensed by that claim to impose a doctrine the people did not choose, and each sincere, which is what makes each so hard to stop.

PART X

THE LEDGER, HONESTLY

The asymmetry held in ink, against the false equivalence the thesis could collapse into; the contested body counts of the first church presented with their ranges and their disputes; the slower and more deniable harms of the second; the genuine goods of each; and the finding that the two churches differ in the scale, speed, and candour of their killing but not in the epistemic disease that produced it — 1917–2010

I. Against False Equivalence

The discipline of the collection is to count honestly and to refuse a symmetry the evidence does not support, and the volume must therefore state plainly that the two churches were not equivalent in their corpses, however identical in their disease. The first church killed more, faster, and more directly than the second, and the volume does not soften this to preserve a tidy parallel. The scale of the first church's killing is itself a contested and weaponised question, and the honest course is to give the ranges and the disputes rather than a single figure. The most-cited aggregate, the *Black Book of Communism*, put the total near ninety-four million and its editor pressed toward a round hundred million — but the figure is contested, and contested most damagingly by the book's own contributors, several of whom publicly disavowed the editor's totals, accused him of inflating the numbers to reach a symbolic figure and to force an equation with Nazism, and objected that, as one of them put it, *death camps did not exist in the Soviet Union*. The more careful scholarship clusters lower and still vast, in a range from roughly sixty-five to ninety-three million, with the largest single components the famines and the camps: the Soviet famine of 1932–33, near 3.9 million dead in Ukraine within a scholarly range of 3.5 to 7 million; the Great Leap famine of 1958–62, between thirty and forty-five million by the mainstream consensus; the Cambodian killing, between roughly 1.5 and 2 million. These numbers are real and must be carried with their full weight, and they are larger than anything the second church directly inflicted. The volume states this without hedging, because the tested posture requires counting the evidence as it is and not as a thesis would prefer it, and because the first church's defenders have too often done to these corpses exactly what a revealed doctrine does — re-described the famine as something other than a refutation, counted the dead as the price of a promised end.

II. The Shared Disease and the Different Harms

The second church's harms were of a different kind, and the difference is real and must be named precisely rather than flattened. They were, in the main, slower, more distributed, more mediated, and

more deniable — the lost decade and the reversed development, the austerity that cut the provisioning of the poor, the round trip that enriched the looters and the banks while the people paid, the structural attrition of nutrition and schooling and health across the indebted South — harms that killed by the impersonal logic of the rate and the conditionality rather than by the commissar's order, and that the distance and the impersonality made far easier to deny and far harder to count. To these the volume adds, as the previous part required, the second church's direct blood in the periphery: the Indonesian slaughter of 1965–66, the anti-communist interventions and dirty wars, the half-million to million dead in the name of containing the rival faith. The honest summary is therefore not that the two churches were equal but that they were asymmetric in their harms and identical in their disease. The first church killed faster, more directly, more categorically, on a larger scale, and denied it harder, with archives sealed and famines unnamed and the very counting of the dead treated as enemy propaganda. The second church killed slower, more distantly, more deniably, with a direct anti-communist blood-letting on top of a vast slow attrition, and denied it differently — not by sealing the archives but by dispersing the responsibility, until no single hand could be found on the lever and the dead could be attributed to the market's impersonal weather rather than to any doctrine at all. And both churches, while they killed, also did real good, which the ledger must enter: each coordinated, in its sphere, a metabolism that kept populations alive past their local carrying capacity, the planned economies industrialising societies that had been agrarian and the market order sustaining a global exchange that fed nations their own soil could not; each delivered, to some, real gains in security or prosperity or dignity. The goods were real and the harms were real and the disease was shared, and the only dishonest account is the one that keeps a single column — that remembers one church's corpses and forgets the other's, or that remembers the harms of both and forgets that each, in its sphere, also fed the living.

PART XI

THE VERDICT AND THE POSTURE

The verdict on the matched pair: not that the two churches were equally bad but that both were revealed where they should have been tested, both run on formed belief, both promising a final state, both counting corpses, differing in scale and speed and candour but not in epistemic structure; and the answer, which is not a third doctrine but a posture — tested not revealed, the gardener not the architect, the plural counterweights tended without end and without the comfort of a final answer — 1789–2026

I. The Verdict

The verdict can now be stated against the whole record, and it is the framework's characteristic one — more interesting than either the triumphalist's account or the equivalence the thesis might be mistaken for. The two great doctrines of the twentieth century were a matched pair: two revealed doctrines, each descended from a situated insight canonised into a self-validating scripture, each run by a formed clergy who held the doctrine as the grammar of reality, each promising a final state in which the conflicts of history would be resolved for good, and each therefore licensed to impose its doctrine on populations that had not chosen it and to count the suffering of the imposition as the finite price of an infinite promised end. They were not equivalent in their corpses; the first killed more, faster, and more directly, and the volume has refused to soften that. They were not equivalent in their candour; the first denied harder, the second more diffusely. But they were identical in the disease that made them lethal, which was not their content — not the plan, not the market — but the revealed posture in which each held its content: the inability to read failure as refutation, the re-description of every defeat as the unfaithfulness of others, the conversion of an imagined final state into a present licence to break the living world to fit the model. And the decolonising world was ground between them not because it chose the wrong church but because the age, foreclosing plurality at the scale of the planet, offered it only churches — two revealed doctrines and no tested alternative, two clergies and no third framework, two promised final states and no permission to treat its own problems as problems to be worked at rather than scriptures to be applied.

II. The Posture, and the Counter-Readings

The answer the volume reaches is the collection's standing one, and it is deliberately not a doctrine, because a doctrine offered as the answer to the two churches would be a third church, and the disease is not cured by a better scripture but by the refusal of the scriptural posture itself. The answer is a

posture: *tested, not revealed*. Debug, do not defend — treat each thesis, including this collection's own, as a hypothesis exposed to evidence and revised when the evidence defeats it, rather than as a revelation whose failures are the failures of the unfaithful. Treat every promise of a final state — the classless society, the end of history, the self-correcting market, and any successor that locates just over the horizon a condition in which the conflicts will be over — as the tell of a revealed doctrine about to count corpses, and hold instead, with Berlin, that the genuine goods of human life are many and not all compatible, that the dream of a final harmony in which they are all reconciled is not merely unattainable but incoherent, and that politics is therefore the permanent negotiation of irreducible conflict and not the implementation of a discovered solution. Tend, without end and without the comfort of an answer, the plural counterweights that no single doctrine owns — the courts and the press and the independent classes and the associations whose existence lets pressure release as reform rather than store for rupture — knowing that they ossify and are captured and must be tended again, that there is no victory but only pressure released for one more generation. Be the gardener Hayek described and his own church forgot, not the architect of either: cultivate the living growth you do not command, work with the grain of the dispersed and local knowledge no model can hold, and refuse the conceit, fatal in both its plan and its market forms, that a complex human society can be redesigned from above and finished.

The strongest counter-readings stand against this verdict and the volume holds them at full strength. The anti-equivalence reading holds that to set the two churches side by side at all is to commit a moral outrage, to launder the market's lesser harms by pairing them with the communist slaughter, or to launder the communist slaughter by pairing it with the market's ordinary failures; and the volume answers that it has refused equivalence explicitly, counted the asymmetry in ink, and paired the two not in their corpses but in their epistemic structure, which is a real and demonstrable likeness and not a moral leveling. The triumphalist reading holds that the second church simply won, that its victory in 1991 vindicated it, and that its harms are the growing pains of a system that has lifted more people from poverty than any in history; and the volume grants the genuine goods, credits the Asian ascent and the global metabolism the market order coordinated, and answers that a doctrine which reads its own victory as a final state and its own failures as insufficient reform has merely demonstrated that it is the surviving church and not that it has escaped the disease — the unchecked decade that followed its victory counted its own corpses, as the dollar studies showed. And the despairing reading holds that if both churches failed and the answer is only a posture and not a programme, then nothing can be built and the volume counsels paralysis; and the volume answers that the posture is not paralysis but the only thing that has ever actually worked — the patient, plural, revisable tending of counterweights that widened liberty wherever it was practised, against the architectural certainty that counted corpses wherever it was believed. The collection publishes, as always, the conditions under which its own verdict would fail: evidence that one of the two doctrines was in fact held as tested by its makers, revised when its evidence defeated it, would move it off the matched-pair finding; evidence that the harms of one church were not the output of its revealed structure but of contingent circumstance would weaken the diagnosis; evidence that a third, tested path was genuinely available to the decolonising world and refused would unsettle the account of the foreclosure. None of these appears in the record as it stands, and the verdict rests on the record as it stands: two churches, one disease, a world ground between them, and an answer that is not a third church but the refusal of the certainty that built the first two. Tested, not revealed: the ledger stays open, as it must, because the day it closes is the day the posture has become the thing it was meant to refuse.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

This is a work of synthesis, and every figure cited and every word quoted has been verified to a primary or authoritative source; the body counts, which are contested and weaponised, are given with their ranges and their disputes.

The epistemic frame draws on Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1958), for the analysis of monism and the belief in a final solution; on James C. Scott's *Seeing Like a State* (1998), for the four conditions of high-modernist disaster, with the extension of the frame to the market church identified as the collection's own; on Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* (1944), for the demonstration that laissez-faire was planned and had become almost a religious creed; on Friedrich Hayek's Nobel lecture "The Pretence of Knowledge" (1974) and his account of the fatal conceit; and on John Gray's *Black Mass* (2007) and *False Dawn* (1998), for the reading of communism and market utopianism as twin secular faiths, a provocative thesis credited here as the case its proponents make.

The first church's lineage follows the collection's own study of the Paris apparatus on Robespierre's doctrine of terror as virtue and its transmission through Lenin, and its study of Marxism-Leninism on the unrealised final state; Lenin's vanguard follows "What Is to Be Done?" (1902). The second church's founding follows the historians of the Mont Pèlerin Society (Vevey, 1947) and the "neoliberal thought collective" of Mirowski and Plehwe; the Chilean case follows the record of the Chile Project, the Chicago Boys, *El Ladrillo*, and Milton Friedman's March 1975 visit and "shock treatment," with Sebastián Edwards's *The Chile Project* (2023) as the corrective against the cartoon of a pure shock doctrine.

The contested body counts follow the scholarship and its disputes: the *Black Book of Communism* (1997) and the public disavowals of its totals by its own contributors Werth, Margolin, and Bartošek; the demographic literature on the Holodomor (a careful estimate near 3.9 million, within a range of 3.5–7 million); the consensus on the Great Leap famine (roughly 30–45 million, Yang Jisheng and Frank Dikötter); the Cambodian toll; and, for the second church's direct blood in the periphery, the record of the Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66 and the documented American support for them. The lost decade, the austerity, and the round trip follow the collection's own dollar studies and the sources cited there.

Contested matters are flagged as such, and no verdict rests on the strongest form of any disputed claim. Where the volume errs, it should err visibly, in a form the cited scholarship can correct.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, not revealed.*